

When Is Deterrence Necessary?

Gauging Adversary Intent

Gary Schaub Jr.

How SHOULD policy makers approach divining the intentions of adversaries who may take actions that the United States wishes to deter? Although deterrence formed the core mission of the American military throughout the Cold War,¹ a great deal of deterrence theory and planning took place in a strategic and political vacuum, one based upon presumptions about the motives of the Soviets and other adversaries. Estimates of adversary intent were based upon capabilities analysis married to worst-case scenarios of what those adversaries could accomplish. Whether deterrence would succeed in general or in any particular case was likewise inferred to be a function of American capabilities and willingness to use them in the event that deterrence failed. What might happen if deterrence succeeded and the adversary's intent was frustrated was rarely considered.

From a theoretical standpoint, deterrence links a demand that the adversary refrain from undertaking a particular action to a threat to use force if the adversary does not comply. Deterrence places the adversary in a situation in which it has a choice of complying with what has been demanded of it—inaction—or defying those demands and risking the implementation of the deterrer's threatened sanction. How the adversary generates expectations about the consequences of its alternatives—what is considered, the relative importance of these considerations, and how these considerations are combined to yield an estimate of consequences—has been the subject of wide and varied speculation.² These expectations are distilled into expected value calculations. Expected value calculations require that the costs and benefits of an outcome be discounted by the probability of its occurrence (i.e., expected value = [benefits – costs] * probability) and that the expected value

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of possible outcomes stemming from a single course of action be summed. In deterrence, the adversary compares the expected value of compliance and defiance. For a deterrence attempt to be successful, the threatened sanction must reduce the expected value of defiance to the degree that it is less than the expected value of compliance. The deterrer can achieve that by threatening to reduce the benefits of defiance or increase its costs. The former would constitute a denial threat, while the latter would be a threat of punishment. And because the adversary will discount these threats by its assessment of the likelihood that the deterrer will implement them, the deterrer must convey these threats credibly.³

The *Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (DO-JOC)*, a product of Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), adopts this framework and by doing so has improved the official conception of deterrence markedly.⁴ It defines “deterrence operations [as those that] convince adversaries not to take actions that threaten US vital interests by means of decisive influence over their decision-making. Decisive influence is achieved by credibly threatening to deny benefits and/or impose costs [if the undesirable action is taken], while encouraging restraint by convincing the actor that restraint will result in an acceptable outcome.”⁵ The *DO-JOC* thus takes an active view of deterrence operations: achieving decisive influence over an adversary’s decision making requires deliberate action on the part of a joint force commander or other US policy makers. Such deterrence operations can include force projection, the deployment of active and passive defenses, global strike (nuclear, conventional, and nonkinetic), and strategic communication.⁶

But when should these actions be undertaken? The timing of immediate deterrent⁷ actions depends upon divining an adversary’s intent. Does the adversary intend to “take actions that threaten US vital interests?” If so, then engaging in deterrence activities to decisively influence the adversary’s decision calculus is required. If not, then no such activities are warranted. If the deterring decision maker makes the wrong call, it could be costly. Such errors are of two types. If the deterrer concludes that the adversary is not inclined to act, absent an influence attempt, and refrains from engaging in deterrence, and the adversary acts, then more demanding activities will be required to rectify the situation. Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s decision to place the Republic of Korea outside of America’s defensive perimeter in his 12 February 1950 speech to the National Press Club and Amb. April Glaspie’s failure to convey the Bush administration’s intent to

preserve the sovereignty of Kuwait with military force if necessary in her 25 July 1990 meeting with Iraqi president Saddam Hussein are two examples of this sort of failure.⁸ On the other hand, if the deterrer believes that a deterrence attempt is warranted and the adversary is not inclined to act, the deterrer's actions can be for naught or even provocative. Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev's decision to emplace nuclear medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba to deter what he believed to be a pending American attempt at regime change was a costly error of this type.⁹

The key to knowing when to practice deterrence is determining an actor's intent. Patrick Morgan notes that "the intentions of opponents are notoriously difficult to fathom."¹⁰ How do joint force commanders, those who populate the staffs of the United States government, and the elites upon whom they rely for subject matter expertise, determine adversary intent? Is there doctrinal guidance that military staffs rely upon to perform this key task? Are there certain patterns of thought or interpretive lenses that are commonly employed by officers, civilian policy makers, or scholars? How have these been applied in key episodes in the past? Finally, how can the process of intent determination be improved?

Doctrinal Guidance

There is little doctrinal guidance for determining adversary intent. What exists is contained in Joint Publication (JP) 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*. This doctrine manual contains superficially useful sections, such as "Intelligence and the Levels of War," "Intelligence and the Range of Military Operations," "Prediction—(Accept the Risk of Predicting Adversary Intentions)," and "Intelligence Support during the Deterrence Phase." Unfortunately, most of these sections are unhelpful. For instance, the deterrence phase section suggests:

During the deterrence phase, the ongoing JIPOE [joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment] effort is accelerated to focus on monitoring the current situation while simultaneously assessing adversary capabilities to affect subsequent phases of the operation. *JIPOE analysts support I&W* [indicators and warnings analysis] *by looking for specific indications of imminent adversary activity* that may require an immediate response or an acceleration of friendly decision-making processes. JIPOE efforts also concentrate on confirming adversary COGs [centers of gravity] and *support the continuous refinement of estimates of adversary capabilities, dispositions, intentions, and probable COAs* [courses of action] within the context of the current situation. At the same time however, JIPOE

analysts must look ahead and prepare threat assessments to support future operations planned for the seizing the initiative, dominance, and stabilization phases. (emphasis added)¹¹

How is this to be done? JP 2-0 indicates that making assessments of adversary intent is difficult and that

the intelligence professional must base predictions on solid analysis using proven tools and methodologies. In conventional analysis, the analyst examines, assesses and compares bits and pieces of raw information, and synthesizes findings into an intelligence product that usually reflects enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities. However, predictive analysis goes beyond the identification of capabilities by forecasting enemy intentions and future COAs. . . . Predictive intelligence is not an exact science and is vulnerable to incomplete information, adversary deception, and the paradox of warning.¹²

Beyond exhorting “intelligence professionals” to “go beyond the identification of capabilities” and take the risk of predicting adversary intent and basing such forecasts on “solid analysis,” JP 2-0 is not particularly helpful in guiding such analysis. Indeed, by indicating that such “an intelligence product . . . usually reflects enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities,” the authors of this doctrine indirectly encourage that capability analysis be substituted for intent analysis. While capabilities do suggest some general directions of intent—why invest in a particular capability if you are not going to use it?—it utterly fails to answer questions of the conditions under which such capabilities would be used. These are political issues that the military intelligence process, set as it is at the tactical or operational level of war, does not address.

Interpreting Intent: Two Frameworks

If joint military doctrine is not a helpful guide in determining adversary intent, how can operators structure this problem so as to solve it? Intelligence analysts operate in a complex environment and, like human beings in general, are unable to process all of the innumerable stimuli they encounter. In this context, Roberta Wohlstetter usefully distinguished “between signals and noise. By the ‘signal’ of an action is meant a sign, a clue, a piece of evidence that points to the action or to an adversary’s intention to undertake it, and by ‘noise’ is meant the background of irrelevant or inconsistent signals, signs pointing in the wrong directions, that tend always to obscure the signs pointing in the right way.”¹³ What Wohlstetter left unsaid is that noise and signals do not come clearly marked for the

analysts as they sift through mountains of information. Rather, it is the analysts who determine what is signal and what is noise.

This is a difficult task. Analysts suffer the same cognitive limits as everyone else and, therefore, necessarily deal with “a dramatically simplified model of the buzzing, blooming confusion that constitutes the real world.”¹⁴ These simplified models of reality focus one’s attention toward certain pieces of information and away from most others and generally represent the “most significant chains of causes and consequences” as “short and simple.”¹⁵ These models allow analysts to discriminate between signals and noise. In most cases, they satisfactorily explain reality—if they did not, humankind would not be able to cope with its environment as well as it has. However, many models may adequately fit the data, and it is up to the analysts to determine which one best explains the adversary’s intent.¹⁶

American scholars and policy makers have been apt to apply one of two models to comprehend the intentions of other international actors, be they states or nonstate organizations engaging in politics. The first is the Strategic Intent Model, and the second is the Internal Logic Model.

Each model posits that the actor of interest is rational and purposive. With regard to rationality, James March observed:

Rational theories of choice assume decision processes that are consequential and preference-based. They are consequential in the sense that action depends on anticipations of the future effects of current actions. Alternatives are evaluated in terms of their expected consequences. They are preference-based in the sense that consequences are evaluated in terms of personal preferences. Alternatives are compared in terms of the extent to which their expected consequences are thought to serve the preferences of the decision maker.¹⁷

Each model also posits that the actor is purposive: that it seeks to achieve a particular goal with each action. When working retrospectively, this presumption risks making either framework tautological, as “an imaginative analyst can construct an account of value-maximizing choice for any action or set of actions.”¹⁸ Tautology can be escaped, however, if it is also presumed that the preferences against which alternatives are considered are relatively stable. This allows analysts to erect a set of principles that appear to guide the actor’s choices over time and across domains. These principles fill in generic references to preferences or utilities for particular actors and allow some degree of operationalization of the model. They can be derived from “(1) propensities or personality traits or psychological tendencies of the nation or government [or nonstate organization], (2) values shared

by the nation or government [or organization], or (3) special principles of action [that] change the 'goals' or narrow the 'alternatives' and 'consequences' considered."¹⁹

The Strategic Intent and Internal Logic Models differ with regard to the problems that they believe an actor is attempting to solve by taking actions in the interstate arena. The Strategic Intent Model presumes that the actor is solving an external problem, while the Internal Logic Model presumes that it is solving an internal one.

The Strategic Intent Model

The Strategic Intent Model presumes that state and nonstate actors direct their behavior toward achieving political goals vis-à-vis external actors. It presumes that they desire to influence the decisions, behavior, and/or attitudes of these other actors and that they have chosen the most effective means available to them, as delimited by their capabilities and tendencies, to achieve this end. Whether they do so via coercion, inducement, or persuasion,²⁰ using whatever power resources they have available, matters not. What does matter is that the impact on the external actor is of paramount concern to the adversary.

Paul Huth has applied the Strategic Intent framework to deterrence situations in this way:

In this rational choice tradition, state leaders considering the use of military force compare the expected utility of using force with that of refraining from a military challenge to the status quo, and they select the option with the greater expected utility. A potential attacker considers the possible gains to be secured by the use of military force to change the status quo and evaluates the likelihood that force can be used successfully. The estimate of the expected utility for military conflict is then compared with the anticipated gains (or losses) associated with not using force and an estimate of how probable those gains/losses would be.²¹

Likewise, the *Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept* assumes that:

- Actions to be deterred result from deliberate and intentional adversary decisions to act (i.e., not from automatic responses or unintended/accidental events).
- Decisions to act are based on actors' calculations regarding alternative courses of action and actors' perceptions of the values and probabilities of alternative outcomes associated with those courses of action.²²

Thus the key variables determining the adversary's intent to act are the costs of undertaking the action, the benefits that would accrue from successful action, and the costs and benefits of not acting. The Strategic Intent Model is vague with regard to what factors determine costs and benefits of these two courses of action. Lawrence Freedman has argued that the costs of undertaking the action can be bifurcated into those costs associated with implementing the choice and those associated with enforcing it after the fact.²³ The costs of implementing the choice can also be further distinguished between those that are entailed in accomplishing the action, those entailed in defending against counteraction by opponents and other parties, and those imposed by those opponents. These final two types of costs would be those incurred by attempting to overcome an opponent's efforts at denying the accomplishment of the goal and those imposed as punishment by the opponent in its attempt to deter further action (or compel cessation, depending upon the manner in which the adversary frames its action). Of course, these would be discounted by associated probabilities that the opponent would undertake such actions. The benefits of undertaking the action have not been given as much attention as the costs, but would be composed of material benefits accrued, intangible benefits (including prestige, reputation, etc.), and the new opportunities made possible by successful conclusion of the action. The costs of inaction—or "restraint," in the parlance of the *DO-JOC*—can be broken down into the international and domestic costs of foregoing action, including suffering the unwanted reactions of opponents in the near and far term and the negative reactions of domestic audiences. The benefits of inaction or restraint have not been well thought out in the literature either, but would include desirable international and domestic reactions—such as praise for being reasonable or a de-escalation of tensions or tangible benefits provided by those who did not favor action. Despite the obvious utility of considering domestic reactions to the choice made by the adversary's leadership, the strategic intent model generally focuses upon externally generated costs and benefits.²⁴

The Internal Logic Model

The Internal Logic Model, on the other hand, presumes that actors are directing their activities inward, enhancing their support or cohesion of the group, and that actions directed toward other actors—be they states or otherwise—are judged primarily by their internal effects rather than

their external effects. Hence, international political behavior is primarily a consequence of domestic (or internal) politics and may be more incidental than intended. "The idea that political elites often embark on adventurous foreign policies or even resort to war in order to distract popular attention away from internal social or economic problems and consolidate their own domestic political support is an old theme in the literature on international politics," argues Jack Levy.²⁵ "War most often promotes the internal unity of each state involved," wrote Ken Waltz. "The state plagued by internal strife may then, instead of waiting for the accidental attack, seek the war that will bring internal peace."²⁶ Ned Lebow argues that states with weakening political systems, weakening political leaders, or elites engaged in a competition for power may "resort to the time-honored technique of attempting to offset discontent at home by diplomatic success abroad."²⁷ While success vis-à-vis external actors would certainly be welcomed, the cohesion within the group and support for the leadership generated by conflict abroad is the primary purpose of such actions.

The key variables within this framework are the internal or domestic groups whose support is required for the continued functioning of the state or nonstate organization. After these have been identified, the relative ability of these groups to influence the leadership by providing benefits, such as continued support, or imposing costs, such as removing the leadership from power; how these audiences view the merits of the action to be undertaken (or not); and the relative ability of the leadership to substitute the support of one group for another must be assessed.²⁸ Thus the Internal Logic framework requires substantial knowledge of the adversary beyond the leadership and its preferences. It requires detailed knowledge of the domestic political situation if the adversary is a state or the internal dynamics of a nonstate organization. A great deal of work has addressed the propensities of certain types of regimes to engage in external behavior to ameliorate internal dissension or promote internal cohesion—democratic states in particular.²⁹ The manner in which deterrent threats are interpreted and used when external behavior is driven by internal needs has received attention from scholars such as Ned Lebow and Janice Stein, but their insights have not been incorporated into the corpus of deterrence theory—to the detriment of our knowledge.³⁰

This has been reflected in how analysts have inferred adversary intent. American policy makers, scholars, and analysts have relied upon these two frameworks of rational action to infer the intent of adversaries. They

clearly direct attention toward different aspects of the adversary's makeup, its capabilities, and particularly, the hierarchy of its goals. Unsurprisingly, they often provide contradictory prescriptions with regard to how to approach an adversary and what to do to influence its behavior. Two short examples of each model in action should make their differences clear.

Sources of Soviet Conduct

During the Cold War, there was a grand debate between those who used the Strategic Intent Model to infer Soviet behavior and those who used the Internal Logic Model. Those who utilized the former can be divided into those who saw Soviet motivations as an attempt to obtain security in an insecure environment and those who saw the USSR as an opportunistic yet traditional great power.

The first group saw the Soviet Union operating in an environment in which it had real enemies and “a compulsion to overinsure against potential threats.”³¹ Soviet leaders inherited traditional Russian insecurities, derived from the lack of geographic barriers to invasions and a history of many such invasions, married to “a politically xenophobic Communist ideology that interpreted the external world as implacable to the Socialist state.”³² In this conception, the Soviets were seen as (over)reactive to the influences of their environment and the behavior of external actors. George Kennan put it thusly: “What is called ‘Soviet behavior’ is, in far higher degree than seems to be realized in Washington, a reaction by the leaders of that country to the manner in which we ourselves treat them.”³³ These analysts therefore argued that American actions should bear in mind Soviet sensitivities and that Washington should pursue policies that avoid unnecessary provocation. Indeed, they saw in this room for cooperation between the superpowers on the basis of overcoming common threats to their security, particularly those caused by the existence of nuclear weapons. Hence, they advocated arms control to enhance strategic stability, non-proliferation efforts to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons, and greater transparency in the form of cooperative security arrangements—all designed to reassure the Soviets that their environment was less dangerous than they perceived and therefore influence their behavior.³⁴

A related strategic view accepted that the Soviet Union received an inheritance from tsarist Russia, particularly its self-image as a great power. According to Kissinger, “Soviet policy is also, of course, the inheritor of an ancient tradition of Russian nationalism. Over centuries the strange

Russian empire has seeped outward . . . across endless plains where no geographical obstacle except distance set a limit to human ambition, inundating what resisted, absorbing what yielded.”³⁵ Its continued outward drive manifested itself in the Cold War era in traditional great-power fashion as continued consolidation of the empire, control over the buffer states of Eastern Europe, preventing encirclement by hostile states, and reshaping the rules of the international system to its liking.³⁶ In essence, those who held this view saw the mellowing of Bolshevik ideological fervor and decreasingly reluctant acceptance of the Soviet Union’s role in the established international system. But they did not infer that Soviet intentions were benign.

This conception emphasized the opportunistic nature of Soviet forays abroad. In his famous article, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” George Kennan argued that Soviet “political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power.”³⁷ Kissinger agreed that “Soviet strategy [is] essentially one of ruthless opportunism.”³⁸

In both variants of the Strategic Intent conception of Soviet intent, the Soviet leadership was composed of clearheaded and rational statesmen operating in an environment where their behavior was determined by the expected value of available courses of action. They were therefore viewed as amenable to influence from external actors—amenable in the sense that they were not implacable or insensitive to the consequences of their actions deriving from the reactions of others. For this reason Kennan prescribed “that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”³⁹ Kissinger likewise counseled that “[t]o foreclose Soviet opportunities is thus the essence of the West’s responsibility. It is up to us to define the limits of Soviet aims.”⁴⁰

This view became the basis for deterrence theory as it developed in the Cold War. The Soviet leaders might desire to take advantage of every opportunity to increase their security, material power, and/or political influence, but American strategists believed that they would not risk war with the United States to obtain these goals. They held this belief for two reasons. First, they knew that Soviet leaders—Stalin in particular—could count, and America’s military and economic preponderance was obvious to all. Therefore, the Soviets would ultimately content themselves with

consolidating that which they already had to avoid overt conflict with the United States. Second, communist ideology would reinforce this tendency. “[T]he Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purposes in a hurry,” argued Kennan. “[I]t can be patient. It has no right to risk the existing achievements of the revolution for the sake of vain baubles of the future.”⁴¹ The Soviets believed that time was on their side and that tactical withdrawals were not indicative of a strategic retreat. “Indeed,” Kennan continued, “the Kremlin has no compunction about retreating in the face of superior force. . . . [I]f it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these philosophically and accommodates itself to them.”⁴² Successful deterrence would depend upon this peculiar Soviet trait. As Bernard Brodie noted, “The saving grace of the Soviet philosophy so far as international relations are concerned is that, unlike the Nazi ideology, it incorporates within itself no time schedule. . . . The Soviet attitude appears to be much more opportunistic. The Soviets may be unshakably convinced that ultimately there must be war. . . . What we can do, however, is to persuade them each time the question arises that ‘the time is not yet!’”⁴³

Those who saw Soviet behavior through the prism of the Internal Logic Model also began their analyses with George Kennan but discounted the ability of external influences to affect Soviet calculations. In this view, dealing with internal solidarity was

one of the most basic of the compulsions which came to act upon the Soviet regime: since capitalism no longer existed in Russia and since it could not be admitted that there could be serious or widespread opposition to the Kremlin springing spontaneously from the liberated masses under its authority, it became necessary to justify the retention of the dictatorship by stressing the menace of capitalism abroad. . . . [T]he stress laid in Moscow on the menace confronting Soviet society from the world outside its borders is founded not in the realities of foreign antagonism but in the necessity of explaining away the maintenance of dictatorial authority at home.⁴⁴

Analysts such as Richard Pipes, Colin Gray, and William Odom continued this line of argument in the late 1970s and early 1980s.⁴⁵ Their analyses suggested that the Soviet system of governance was characterized by “endemic militarism” and that it was “as central to Soviet communism as the pursuit of profit is to societies with market-oriented economies.”⁴⁶ Thus the use of force abroad was seen as a good in itself, one that enhanced the identity of the Soviet state. “According to this view,” wrote Seay, “the Soviet iteration of an implacable foreign threat results not from

paranoia or from fear of invasion but rather from the regime's self-interest, a foreign threat being an indispensable element in the regimentation of Soviet society."⁴⁷ Indeed, this posture had "the additional benefit of helping to legitimize an otherwise illegitimate regime."⁴⁸

The Internal Logic view of the Soviets' conduct implied that there was a fundamental impediment to changing their behavior. They could not be influenced on a case-by-case basis through coercive strategies, such as deterrence, or induced through acts of good will or persuaded through diplomacy. Given that the sources of Soviet conduct were internal and endemic, only physical barriers to Soviet action would affect them. Only if they were physically denied the ability to achieve their goals would they refrain from acting. Analysts who held this view argued strenuously for national missile defense as an alternative to an inherently unreliable deterrent, against strategic nuclear arms control, and were opposed to détente.⁴⁹

These analysts did believe that it was possible for the United States to achieve its objectives vis-à-vis the Soviet Union—once it collapsed. Kennan had argued that the internal contradictions of the Soviet system and the unbearable strain that it placed on its population could result in collapse. "Soviet Russia might be changed overnight from one of the strongest to one of the most pitiable of national societies," he argued.⁵⁰ But those who emphasized the internal logic of the Soviet system as the motivator behind its policies saw such a collapse as perhaps the only way to ultimately affect Soviet behavior. Pipes, for instance, argued that "[t]he Soviet Union will be a partner in peace only when it makes peace with its own people. Only then will the danger of nuclear war recede."⁵¹

Clearly, there were substantial differences in the views and prescriptions of analysts who utilized the Strategic Intent Model to infer Soviet intentions and those who used the Internal Logic Model. These views helped shape the debates of US foreign policy, particularly after the Vietnam War, and continue to have echoes today. Some of these are evident in the way in which the intentions of terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda or Hamas are debated.

Terrorist Objectives

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, there was a tendency on the part of the public, the media, and some policy makers to eschew either model of rational and purposive adversary behavior in favor of an instinctive

one. It posited that Islamic terrorists such as those in al-Qaeda “hate us for who we are rather than what we do.”⁵² Similar language was included in the 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States*, which identified “rogue states” as those that “reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands.”⁵³ When one posits that adversary intent derives from raw emotion, such as hatred, and such emotion permeates all members and aspects of an adversary’s organization—be it a state or a nonstate actor—strategic thought is likely to be bypassed in favor of brute force.

In the analytic community, however, affective models of adversary behavior have not been paramount. Indeed, the Strategic Intent Model has been primary.⁵⁴ Max Abrahms noted that

the strategic model assumes that terrorists are motivated by relatively stable and consistent political goals. . . . Second, the strategic model assumes that terrorism is a ‘calculated course of action’ and that . . . terrorist groups weigh their political options and resort to terrorism only after determining that alternative political avenues are blocked [or at least not as efficacious], . . . [and] they possess ‘reasonable expectations’ of the political consequences of using terrorism based on its prior record of coercive effectiveness.⁵⁵

The Strategic Intent Model also applies to suicide terrorism, where motives have often been identified as religious fanaticism or insanity. Bob Pape argues that “what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland.”⁵⁶

This has been reflected in policy framing as well. Pres. George W. Bush opined in his address to Congress on 20 September 2001 that

al-Qaeda is to terror what the Mafia is to crime. But its goal is not making money, its goal is remaking the world and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere. . . . They want to overthrow existing governments in many Muslim countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. They want to drive Israel out of the Middle East. They want to drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions of Asia and Africa. These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life. With every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends. They stand against us because we stand in their way.⁵⁷

Prescriptions derived from the Strategic Intent framework suggest that terrorists can be deterred by increasing the difficulty of their efforts to execute their strategy or by imposing costs on the groups involved through

sanctions or other forms of punishment. They also suggest that terrorists can be placated by concessions that allow them to achieve many of their objectives without the resort to violence.⁵⁸ As Abrahms explains, these “are designed to reduce terrorism by divesting it of its political utility.”⁵⁹ Over time, as their strategy of coercion is both frustrated tactically and successful strategically, it is argued that terrorists will moderate their behavior and be co-opted into the normal political processes of the state—be it their own, as happened with the Palestinian Liberation Organization, or that of their former adversary, as happened with the Irish Republican Army.

On the other hand, the Internal Logic Model has also been utilized to explain terrorism. Paul Davis and Brian Jenkins have argued that “Deterrence [of terrorist groups] is . . . difficult because for many of the people involved, terrorism is a way of life. . . . [T]errorism provides ‘positives’—notably status, power, recruits, and psychological rewards.”⁶⁰ Mia Bloom argues that “under conditions of mounting public support, [suicide] bombings have become a method of recruitment for militant Islamic organizations within the Palestinian community. They serve at one and the same time to attack the hated enemy (Israel) and to give legitimacy to outlier militant groups who compete with the Palestinian Authority for leadership of the community.”⁶¹ Bloom further argues that as the Intifada continued and Arafat’s Palestinian Authority lost its monopoly over the legitimate use of force—legitimate in the eyes of the Palestinian people—“groups competed and outbid each other with more spectacular bombing operations and competition over claiming responsibility. At the same time, the operations whipped up nationalist fervor and swelled the ranks of Islamic Jihad and Hamas, who used the bombings, in conjunction with the provision of social services, to win the hearts and minds of the Palestinians.”⁶²

The use of terror operations in the competition between these groups for leadership of the movement and recruitment and retention of members is to the detriment of their strategic cause, argues Bloom, and has left Palestinians worse off than they were before the suicide bombing campaigns began.⁶³ Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter argue, as does Abrahms, that Palestinian terrorists prefer to continue their activities in spite of the possibility of achieving their political goals through less violent means—or even as a result of successful coercion.⁶⁴ They therefore act as spoilers to any political settlement and perpetuate the conflict that provides their *raison d’être*. The violence is not a means to a political end vis-à-vis their adversary but, instead, a means to a sense of honor, group

worth, and identity.⁶⁵ Indeed, the effects of violence in these areas have even been termed a “public good” for the group by one terrorism analyst.⁶⁶

The Internal Logic framework suggests that the internal dynamics of terrorist groups drive their activities, not the potential attainment of a strategic goal. This suggests that influencing their behavior will be difficult absent destruction of the terrorist groups and those that support them. Indeed, Abrahms argues that “strategies to dry up demand for terrorism by minimizing its political utility are misguided and hence unlikely to work.”⁶⁷ The October 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States argued that “traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy.”⁶⁸ And because of this, Pres. George W. Bush argued that “our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for pre-emptive action when necessary.”⁶⁹ To many, this leaves brute force to eliminate the adversary as the only effective policy.⁷⁰ As Ralph Peters stated, “We shall hear no end of fatuous arguments to the effect that we can’t kill our way out of the problem. Well, until a better methodology is discovered, killing is a good interim solution.”⁷¹

Prescriptive Problems

The Strategic Intent Model and the Internal Logic Model of adversary intent produce very different pictures of what motivates an adversary. Does the adversary desire to influence external actors to achieve a political outcome vis-à-vis those actors? Or does it desire to bolster the solidarity of the group in the face of centripetal forces? Is the outcome of the action that we wish to deter of primary or secondary importance to the adversary? Making this determination is important when deciding whether to attempt to deter the adversary’s actions or to take another approach, such as preemptive brute force or measures to increase or decrease its feelings of insecurity.

Deterrence is a strategy to pursue when one judges that the adversary’s resort to arms is motivated primarily by strategic goals. Given that it is directed toward external actors in such situations, identification of the adversary’s goal is a matter of routine. Focusing deterrent demands toward that objective—“don’t do *that*”—places the adversary in a decision situation in which it can either comply with what has been demanded of it or defy those demands and risk the implementation of the deterrer’s threatened sanction. As the *Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept* rightly

suggests, denying the adversary's leadership the potential benefits of the actions that it intends to take or imposing costs that reduce the net utility of those actions are the two ideal ways of reducing the likelihood that the adversary will choose to act.⁷² The objective of this deterrent threat is to reduce the expected value of "doing that" to a point that the consequences of compliance are of greater value. As the *DO-JOC* explains, "Adversaries weigh the perceived benefits and costs of a given course of action *in the context of* their perceived consequences of restraint or inaction. Thus deterrence can fail even when the adversary perceives the costs of acting as outweighing the benefits of acting if [it] believes the costs of inaction are even higher still" (emphasis in original).⁷³ When the adversary is basing its choice upon these considerations, deterrence is correctly targeted and has a chance of success.

Deterrence may not be the strategy to pursue if the adversary's external behavior is directed toward enhancing internal cohesion or the power of the leadership. Providing overt signs of an external threat is precisely the outcome desired by the adversary's leadership. This external threat allows them to act to increase their support, silence moderates or critics, mobilize resources that might otherwise be unavailable, and provide the opportunity for common identities to be forged or reinforced. These goals can be achieved only if the deterrer provides the missing ingredient: its hostile reaction. If the deterrer falls into the trap, then the adversary has the means it needs to achieve its goal of increased cohesion. If the deterrer refrains from reacting, then the adversary may still capitalize on the lack of a reaction to motivate support for strong leadership. Yet this is less likely than action provoking hostility, as people are less motivated to act to seize opportunities than they are to avoid potential losses.⁷⁴

Detering Adversaries Motivated by Internal Logic

If the adversary is motivated by internal logic, is this really a no-win situation for the deterrer? Is deterrence a nonstarter? Are there alternatives to issuing an immediate deterrent threat directed against the adversary's intended external action or doing nothing and letting its provocation pass unanswered? There are a number of options.

First, one can still attempt to deter the adversary directly through passive measures that deny it the opportunity to carry out its aggressive intent and also deny it the visible indicators of hostility that it seeks to engender. There

are a number of means that can be used to do this. One denial measure is to harden soft targets—be they ICBM silos or police stations—through passive-point defenses. This makes it less likely that spectacular successes can be had against these targets, and given their passivity, defenses such as barriers, reinforced concrete, or even ballistic missile defenses (provided that they are well beyond the ability of the adversary to observe) deprive the deterrer of the ability to overreact and justify the adversary's actions.⁷⁵ Passive-area defenses can also be used to deny the adversary the interaction that it needs with the deterrer to achieve its internal goals. Possibilities in this realm include measures such as the fence that Israel has erected around Palestinian areas, which has decreased suicide attacks substantially since its completion,⁷⁶ or diplomatic isolation such as that imposed upon the People's Republic of China, Cuba, or Iran after their revolutions. A potential drawback to passive-area defenses is that they themselves might become symbols of implacable and unyielding hostility that the adversary can use repeatedly to rally its domestic constituents.⁷⁷

Second, one can attempt to deter the adversary indirectly—by directing the deterrent threat toward members of the group that the leadership is attempting to bolster or recruit. The adversary's external challenge is designed to attract these followers, and a deterrent threat that is directed toward the group's members and potential members may cleave them away by highlighting personal over group interests.⁷⁸ All groups engaged in conflict that are attempting to recruit or retain members ask these people to put aside their personal interests for the benefit of the group cause, even though their individual contributions will be marginal (in most cases: suicide terrorism is designed to overcome this recruitment challenge). "Thus rebels confront the possibility of disastrous private costs and uncertain public benefits. . . . Unless the collective action problem is somehow overcome, rational people will never rebel—rebellions, that is, require irrationality."⁷⁹ Israel has pursued a policy of deterring group members by threatening to destroy the family homes of young Palestinians who were involved in attacks.⁸⁰ Aerial surveillance capabilities, such as that of the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle, have been key to operationalizing this strategy. Such an option would attempt to deny the adversary leadership the domestic benefits of its intended action by threatening to punish individual members of the group.

Third, one can pursue a similar goal through inducements to members of the adversary's constituency rather than through coercion. COIN

strategies, such as those discussed in FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, work on this principle. “The real battle is for civilian support for, or acquiescence to, the counterinsurgents and host nation government. The population waits to be convinced. Who will help them more, hurt them less, stay the longest, earn their trust?”⁸¹ Indeed, the “Anbar Awakening” in Iraq is quite a vivid example of using inducements to cleave potential supporters away from an adversary—in this case al-Qaeda in Iraq.⁸² Abrahms suggests that a variant of this strategy worked well for the Italian government in its campaign against the Red Brigades, where captured members were offered reduced sentences in exchange for information about their fellows.⁸³

Fourth, one can attempt to “encourage adversary restraint,” as the *DO-JOC* puts it, by “try[ing] to communicate . . . benign intentions . . . to reduce the fear, misunderstanding, and insecurity that are often responsible for unintended escalation to war.”⁸⁴ Engaging in such persuasion is an alternative to influence through coercion or inducement. It involves altering the considerations by which compliance and defiance are evaluated. The persuader does not promise or threaten action, but convinces the adversary to see the situation in such a way that it realizes it is in its own interest to act a certain way. This can be done by highlighting—without altering—costs or benefits related to complying with or defying the persuader’s demands or by offering new alternatives that allow the adversary to achieve its goals in ways that do not harm the persuader’s interests. These persuasion strategies treat the definition of the problem facing the adversary—in this case increasing cohesion, recruitment, or retention of members—as given or settled. Another avenue of persuasion requires understanding the basis upon which the target frames the issue and then shifting it.⁸⁵ Persuasion is generally seen as a fruitless option, particularly when dealing with an adversary whose primary concerns are internally generated. Indeed, Kennan argued that “the individuals who are components of this machine [the Soviet regime] are unamenable to argument or reason which comes to them from outside sources.”⁸⁶ Yet it remains a component of various strategies.

Fifth, one can forego influence altogether and use brute force against the adversary to prevent it from undertaking action.⁸⁷ This can take the form of disarming the adversary to deny it the capability to pursue the action that it intends or decapitating the adversary so as to disrupt its ability to act. Either action risks increasing the cohesion of the adversary by justifying its hostility toward the deterrer and/or creating a martyr of

the leadership. Decapitation of the leadership could also disrupt the internal cohesion of the adversary to some degree.⁸⁸

Overall, if one determines that an adversary decision maker is motivated by the internal logic of the group's situation, deterrence may work—but not in the manner prescribed in the *DO-JOC*. Rather, deterrent demands and other influence attempts should be directed at the primary objectives of the adversary in these situations: the internal constituencies whose support the leadership hopes to rally by its external actions. Clearly, steps should also be taken to mitigate the impact of those actions as well, since nothing fails like failure. Bear in mind, however, that mere signals of hostility directed toward the group (or nation) as a whole in an attempt to deter the unwanted action could provide the adversary leadership precisely what it wants: an external enemy that its people can oppose in unity.

Conclusion

Deterrence has formed the core mission of the US military since the Cold War era; however, a great deal of deterrence theory and planning derived from presumptions about adversary intent which were based on capabilities analysis with no consideration of what might happen if deterrence succeeded and the adversary's intent was frustrated. The *DO-JOC* rectified a basic problem in previous deterrence thinking by recognizing that an adversary has a choice between complying with a demand to refrain from action and defying that demand—and that the adversary will consider the expected value of each of these options. No longer is “restraint” considered an option that is outside of the deterrence calculus for the adversary or the deterrer. This has opened significant doors to making the deterrence planning and assessment processes used by the US military, from the Strategic Command to the regional combatant commands, much more sophisticated and, hopefully, effective.

Getting the basic framework correct has led to the next issue: determining how much the adversary desires to undertake particular actions—those that the United States would prefer that it not undertake and others that might provide less offensive alternatives. This requires assessing adversary intent. Regrettably, there is no set process or framework for undertaking this necessary analysis. JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*, merely exhorts intelligence analysts to “take risks” to “predict” adversary intent. Intelligence officers, uniformed and civilian, have indicated that producing such analyses is


considered more of an art than a science and that no processes have been established; rather, intelligence analysts are left to develop their own methods to produce their analytic products.⁸⁹ Hoping that particular analysts in key positions are another da Vinci or Michelangelo is simply unacceptable. Military staffs excel at planning and use set processes to yield acceptable and improvable products. Such a process needs to be established to infer adversary intent on a continuous basis so that a usable product is available to assist in routine planning or in the event of a crisis.

Such a process should begin with a skeleton framework that focuses on producing at least two narratives of adversary behavior: a Strategic Intent Model and an Internal Logic Model. The Strategic Intent narrative would build a case that the adversary was intending to act to achieve external goals. It should begin with an overview of the adversary's grand strategy: the goals that its leadership has traditionally sought, the goals sought by its current leadership, the environment in which it finds itself and how it facilitates or hinders pursuit of those goals, and the capabilities it possesses to overcome these obstacles and take advantage of situations as they arise. The narrative should also locate the adversary's potential actions in its strategic culture and operational procedures so that indicators and warnings can be identified to provide information about intent as events unfold.

The Internal Logic narrative would build a similar case to explain what the adversary might intend to do, but its focus would be on the internal or domestic imperatives and constraints facing the adversary's leadership. Such a narrative would begin by identifying the structure of the leadership, those who hold those positions, and their relations to one another. It would also identify various internal constituencies the leadership is dependent upon or responsible to, in particular those in a position to sanction or reward those leaders' behavior. Finally, it would attempt to identify the internal problem that the adversary leaders would attempt to solve by acting externally. As with the Strategic Intent Model, indicators and warnings keyed to the reactions of these domestic constituencies should be constructed to provide information that can confirm or invalidate hypotheses about the adversary's intent as events unfold.

As discussed in preceding sections, these two frameworks have provided the basis for rival interpretations of adversary behavior from that of the Soviet Union during the Cold War to terrorist organizations today. They have also provided alternative prescriptions for American behavior. Their explicit use would allow debate and discussion in the intent assessment

process that could inform commanders or political leaders about the issues, foreign and domestic, that are pressing on the adversary's leadership; provide planning staffs the basis for recommending whether deterrence or some other strategy is wise in the present circumstances; and also provide a basis upon which to assess the likelihood of success. Prescribing that at least two frameworks be used rather than a single consolidated one will assist in highlighting the biases inherent in each framework as well as those introduced by the analysts themselves and mitigate the dangers of groupthink.⁹⁰ This would greatly enhance the ability of commanders to determine when deterrence is wise, when it is necessary, and how best to implement it.

Developing an intent assessment process would also help to operationalize and institutionalize the Department of Defense's current concerns with cultural competency and provide the basis for the personnel system to reward those officers who excel in this particularly useful but heretofore neglected area of professional expertise. Thus many goods would follow from a more coherent and systematic process assessing adversary intent. 

Notes

1. Indeed, as Bernard Brodie famously put it, "Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose," Bernard Brodie, "Implications for Military Policy," in *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order*, ed. Bernard Brodie (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946), 76.

2. See, for example, William W. Kaufmann, "The Requirements of Deterrence," in *Military Policy and National Security*, ed. William W. Kaufmann (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1956); Alexander George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); and Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980," *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (July 1984).

3. See Daryl G. Press, *Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), for a discussion of the constituents of credibility.

4. Previous official conceptions of deterrence have been underdeveloped. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, as well as its predecessor, JCS Publication 1, *Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage*, define deterrence as "the prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction." This definition does not specify the relationship between "fear" and reasoned consideration of consequences, the nature of the "credible threat of unacceptable counter action," nor its origin. It also reflected and encouraged considering deterrence only in the nuclear context. As late as January 2007, the US Air Force, for example, subsumed deterrence under nuclear operations. Its *Air Force Glossary* only mentions deterrence in its definition of "mutual assured destruction." Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1-2, *Air Force Glossary*, 11 January 2007, 58.

5. US Strategic Command, *Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept*, Version 2.0, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, December 2006), 3. [Hereafter: STRATCOM, *DO-JOC*]
6. *Ibid.*, 6.
7. Patrick Morgan defines immediate deterrence situations as those “where at least one side is seriously considering an attack while the other is mounting a threat of retaliation in order to prevent it,” Patrick Morgan, *Deterrence*, 2d ed. (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1983), 30.
8. On Acheson, see John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 70–75. On Glaspie, see Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict, 1990–1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 50–55; and Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990–91: A Failed or Impossible Task?” *International Security* 17, no. 2 (Fall 1992). Of course, Glaspie could not convey such an American intent at that meeting as it was not clear that it existed.
9. See Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 27–32; and Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 260–66.
10. Morgan, *Deterrence*, 39.
11. JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*, 22 June 2007, IV-13.
12. *Ibid.*, II-9–10.
13. Roberta Wohlstetter, “Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight,” *Foreign Affairs* 43, no. 4 (July 1965): 691.
14. Herbert A. Simon, *Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organizations*, 3d ed. (New York: Free Press, 1976), xxix.
15. *Ibid.*, xxx.
16. Any framework that simplifies reality will not be neutral. It will bias the decision maker’s observations and inferences. It will therefore result in at least some misperceptions. See Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). Although Jervis and others make the case that misperceptions inherently undermine the quality of decision making, this is not necessarily the case, as argued by Jack S. Levy, “Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems,” *World Politics* 36, no. 1 (October 1983); Gerd Grigerenzer and Daniel G. Goldstein, “Reasoning the Fast and Frugal Way: Models of Bounded Rationality,” *Psychological Review* 103, no. 4 (1996); and J. M. Goldgeier and P. E. Tetlock, “Psychology and International Relations Theory,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (2001), 67–92.
17. James G. March with Chip Heath, *A Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen* (New York: Free Press, 1994), 2–3.
18. Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), 35.
19. *Ibid.*, 36–37.
20. For the relations between these forms of influence, see the *Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept*, Version 0.5, (25 April 2008), 101–3.
21. Paul K. Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999): 28–29; and Huth, “Military Deterrence and Statecraft,” in *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict*, vol. 2, ed. Lester Kurtz (San Diego: Academic Press, 1999), 465–66.
22. STRATCOM, *DO-JOC*, 11.
23. Lawrence Freedman, “Strategic Coercion,” in *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*, ed. Lawrence Freedman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), xx.

24. The lack of domestic-level independent variables is considered in Gary Schaub Jr., "Deterrence, Compellence, and Rational Decision Making" (PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh, 2003).
25. Jack S. Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique," in *The Handbook of War Studies*, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 259.
26. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), 81.
27. Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 66–69; quoted material on page 66.
28. For an overly abstract discussion of these variables, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, *The Logic of Political Survival* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003).
29. For a recent study, see David J. Bulé, "Congress, Presidential Approval, and U.S. Dispute Initiation," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 4, no. 4 (October 2008).
30. Rather, their work is seen as providing an alternative to deterrence theory. See Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," *Journal of Social Issues* 43, no. 4 (1987); Lebow and Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," *World Politics* 41, no. 2 (January 1989); Paul Huth and Bruce M. Russett, "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes A Difference," *World Politics* 42, no. 4 (July 1990); and Lebow and Stein, "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable," *World Politics* 42, no. 3 (April 1990).
31. Douglas Seay, "What are the Soviets' Objectives in their Foreign, Military, and Arms Control Policies?" in *Nuclear Arguments: Understanding the Strategic Nuclear Arms and Arms Control Debates*, eds. Lynn Eden and Steven E. Miller (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 71.
32. *Ibid.*, 72.
33. George F. Kennan, "Toward Peace on Two Fronts," *Christianity and Crisis* (13 December 1982): 378.
34. Seay, "What are the Soviets' Objectives?" 76–87.
35. Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1979), 118. "The result is a foreign policy free to fill every vacuum, to exploit every opportunity, to act out the implications of its doctrine. Policy is constrained principally by calculations of objective conditions." *Ibid.*, 117.
36. Dmitri K. Simes, "Assessing Soviet National Security Strategy," in *Understanding U.S. Strategy: A Reader*, ed. Terry L. Heynes (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1983), 210–12.
37. George F. Kennan, "Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* 65, no. 4 (Spring 1987): 861.
38. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 119.
39. Kennan, "Sources of Soviet Conduct," 861.
40. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 119.
41. Kennan, "Sources of Soviet Conduct," 860–61.
42. *Ibid.*, 861. Here Kennan was elaborating on Lenin's dictum: "If one encounters steel, withdraw; but if one finds mush, push on."
43. Bernard Brodie, "The Atom Bomb as Policy Maker," *Foreign Affairs* 27, no. 1 (October 1948): 23. Also see Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine* (New York: Free Press, 1953), 11; and William W. Kaufmann, "Limited Warfare," in *Military Policy and National Security*, 103.
44. Kennan, "Sources of Soviet Conduct," 856–57.

45. See Richard Pipes, "Militarism and the Soviet State," *Daedalus* 109 (Fall 1980); Pipes, *Survival is Not Enough: Soviet Realities and America's Future* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984); Colin S. Gray, "SALT II: The Real Debate," *Policy Review* 10 (Fall 1979); Gray, *Missiles Against War: The ICBM Debate Today* (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, 1985); and William E. Odom, "Whither the Soviet Union?" *Washington Quarterly* 4 (Spring 1981).
46. Seay, "What are the Soviets' Objectives?" 54; and Pipes, "Militarism and the Soviet State," 1.
47. Seay, "What are the Soviets' Objectives?" 55.
48. Ibid.
49. "Both Nitze and Gray have in mind using the perceived advantages of SDI to push the Soviet Union toward a reformulation of deterrence, from an offense-based MAD to a deterrence based upon defensive systems." Seay, "What are the Soviets' Objectives?" 69–70.
50. Kennan, "Sources of Soviet Conduct," 868, 866.
51. Pipes, *Survival is not Enough*, 278.
52. Victor Davis Hanson, "Islamicists hate us for who we are, not what we do," *Jewish World Report*, 13 January 2005, http://www.jewishworldreview.com/0105/hanson2005_01_13.php3.
53. *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: White House, October 2002), 14.
54. Early work includes Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism: Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice," in *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, ed. Walter Reich (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Thomas C. Schelling, "What Purpose Can 'International Terrorism' Serve?" in *Violence, Terrorism, and Justice*, ed. R. G. Frey and Christopher W. Morris (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
55. Max Abrahms, "What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy," *International Security* 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008): 80–81.
56. Robert A. Pape, *Dying to Win: the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2005), 4.
57. "Transcript of President Bush's address to a joint session of Congress on Thursday night, September 20, 2001," available at <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/>.
58. See Daniel Byman, "The Decision to Begin Talks with Terrorists: Lessons for Policy-makers," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29, no. 6 (June 2006); and Peter R. Neumann, "Negotiating with Terrorists," *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 1 (January/February 2007). Jones and Libicki found that 43 percent of terrorist groups that ceased to exist between 1968 and 2006 did so because their goals were accommodated by political authorities. See Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qaeda* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2008).
59. Abrahms, "What Terrorists Really Want," 103.
60. Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, *Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on al Qaeda* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), 5.
61. Mia M. Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing, Public Support, Market Share, and Out-bidding," *Political Science Quarterly* 119, no. 1 (2004): 61. More generally, see Joao Ricardo Faria and Daniel G. Arce M., "Terror Support and Recruitment," *Defense and Peace Economics* 16, no. 4 (August 2005).
62. Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing," 71.
63. Ibid., 62; and Daniel Byman, "Do Targeted Killings Work?" *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 2 (March/April 2006): 98.
64. Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, "Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence," *International Organization* 56, no. 2 (Spring 2002); and Abrahms, "What Terrorists Really Want," 92–93.

65. Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing," 74; and Jerrold M. Post, "Deterrence in an Age of Asymmetric Rivals," in *Understanding the Bush Doctrine: Psychology and Strategy in an Age of Terrorism*, eds. Stanley A. Renshon and Peter Suedfeld (New York: Routledge, 2007), 171.
66. Nichole Argo, "The Banality of Evil: Understanding Today's Human Bombs" (unpublished manuscript, Stanford University, 2003), 13; cited by Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing," 74.
67. Abrahms, "What Terrorists Really Want," 103.
68. *National Security Strategy of the United States* (2002), 15.
69. Press Release, "President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point," Office of the Press Secretary, 1 June 2002, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>.
70. Gerard Alexander, "International Relations Theory Meets World Politics: The Neo-conservative vs. Realism Debate," in *Understanding the Bush Doctrine*, 48–50.
71. Ralph Peters, "Thou Shalt Kill," *Harper's Magazine* (January 2005), <http://harpers.org/archive/2005/01/0080344>.
72. STRATCOM, *DO-JOC*, 26–27.
73. *Ibid.*, 21.
74. On the differential weighting of gains and losses generally, see Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, "Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 5, no. 1 (Winter 1991). For an application to the domestic costs of conflict, see Miroslav Nincic, "Loss Aversion and the Domestic Context of Military Intervention," *Political Research Quarterly* 50, no. 1 (March 1997).
75. This is an application of Schelling's art of the commitment. See Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New Haven: Harvard University Press, 1960).
76. Byman, "Do Targeted Killings Work?" 96, 105–6.
77. Matthew Kalman, "Israeli fence puts 'cage' on villagers: More Palestinians scrambling to keep barrier from going up," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 9 March 2004, <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2004/03/09/MNGIP5H0IL1.DTL>.
78. See Julian Tolbert, *Crony Attack: Strategic Attack's Silver Bullet?* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2003); and Mark Irving Lichbach, *The Rebel's Dilemma* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998). On the other hand, Jerrold Post argues that "Once in the group, though, the power of group dynamics is immense, continually confirming the power of the group's organizing ideology and reinforcing the member's dedication to the cause." Post, "Deterrence in an Age of Asymmetric Rivals," 171.
79. Lichbach, *Rebel's Dilemma*, 7.
80. "Israeli officials said that the destruction of an Arab home with dynamite or bulldozers was a rare, deliberate, and highly publicized event, designed to serve as an effective deterrent to adults who might permit or encourage illegal acts by younger members of their families." Jimmy Carter, *Palestine: Peace, Not Apartheid* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 123. Israel stopped this policy in February 2005 after it was challenged domestically by human rights groups. "Israel to destroy attacker's home," *BBC News*, 7 April 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/7490212.stm.
81. Sarah Sewall, "Introduction to the University of Chicago Press Edition: A Radical Field Manual," in *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), xxv.
82. A nice account can be found in Thomas Ricks, *The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006–2008* (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 61–72. For an analysis, see Andrew W. Koloski and John S. Kolasheski, "Thickening the Lines: Sons of Iraq, A Combat Multiplier," *Military Review* 89 (January/February 2009).

83. Abrahms, "What Terrorists Really Want," 105.
84. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," *Journal of Social Issues* 43, no. 4 (1987): 40.
85. There are generally three such bases: consequentialism, authority, or principles. Consequentialism is the easiest basis in which to operate, as the adversary is considering outcomes, and these are all potential as opposed to actual. They can therefore be altered by shifting the type of problem to be solved and, hence, the solution set from which it is appropriate to consider options. Authority-based frames are more difficult to affect because they are given to the adversary by another party, one to which it has previously ceded decision authority. Thus a better target for the influence attempt is that decision authority. Another approach here is to provide the adversary with another authority to which it has previously ceded the decision—one that conflicts with the current authority frame—and make the case that it should switch. Finally, frames based upon principle are likewise difficult to affect, although the mechanism is similar: find a principle to which the adversary adheres and make the case that it applies more than the principle that provided the basis for defiance.
86. Kennan, "Sources of Soviet Conduct," 860.
87. Jones and Libicki found that only 7 percent of terrorist groups that "ended" in their sample of 268 such groups were defeated by military force. "Militaries tended to be most effective when used against terrorist groups engaged in an insurgency in which the groups were large, well armed, and well organized. Insurgent groups have been among the most capable and lethal terrorist groups, and military force has usually been a necessary component in such cases. Against most terrorist groups, however, military force is usually too blunt an instrument." Jones and Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End*, xiii–xiv.
88. Lisa Langdon, Alexander J. Sarapu, and Matthew Wells, "Targeting the Leadership of Terrorist and Insurgent Movements: Historical Lessons for Contemporary Policy Makers," *Journal of Public and International Affairs* 15 (Spring 2004), found that killing the leader of a nonstate movement led to the disbanding or moderation of the movement in 61 percent of the cases that they examined.
89. Personal interviews with author.
90. For more on motivated and unmotivated biases, see Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. On groupthink, see Irving L. Janis, *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982); and Marlene E. Turner and Anthony R. Pratkanis, "Theoretical Perspectives on Groupthink: A Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Appraisal," *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 73, no. 2/3 (February/March 1998). Alexander L. George prescribes multiple assessments and other process fixes to this dilemma in "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review* 66, no. 3 (September 1972) as does Paul 't Hart, in "Preventing Groupthink Revisited: Evaluating and Reforming Groups in Government," *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 73, no. 2/3 (February/March 1998).